

HTS-7526-R1 Hifz Al-Din (Maintaining
Religion) and Hifz Al-Ummah
(Developing the Nation Integration):
Resistance Muslim Youth to non-Muslim
Leaders Candidates in Election

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MANUSCRIPT TO REVIEW

Hifz Al-Din (Maintaining Religion) and Hifz Al-Ummah (Developing the Nation Integration): Resistance Muslim Youth to non-Muslim Leaders Candidates in Election

Muslims in Indonesia were afraid that non-Muslim regional heads would disturb the teachings of Islam and make policies that could make Muslims difficult to carry out worship, and *ukhuwah Islamiyah* among Muslims would be tenuous. The purpose of this study is to determine the factors that could contribute to Muslim youth's resistance to non-Muslim regional head candidates in regional head elections. This study uses a cross-sectional design conducted by interviewing 1121 Muslim youths who participated in regional head elections in North Sumatra. Multivariate analysis in this study used a logistic regression test with JAPS 16 software. The results of this study indicate that Muslim youth in North Sumatra Province have high resistance to candidates for regional heads of non-Muslim religion (Governor and Mayor). *Hifz Al-Din* (Maintaining Religion) ($p < 0.001$; $\text{Exp}(\beta) = 2,505$) is seen to affect the resistance of Muslim youth to non-Muslim governor candidates; *Hifz Al-Din* ($p < 0.001$; $\text{Exp}(\beta) = 2.053$) is seen to affect the resistance of Muslim youth to non-Muslim mayoral candidates; *Hifz Al-Ummah* (Developing the Nation Integration) ($p = 0.001$; $(\beta) = 2.194$) is seen to have influenced the resistance of Muslim youth to non-Muslim governor candidates; *Hifz Al-Ummah* ($p = 0.011$; $\text{Exp}(\beta) = 1.800$) affects the resistance of Muslim youth to non-Muslim mayoral candidates. Muslim youth have high resistance to non-Muslim leaders when participating in elections. Muslim youth are afraid that prospective non-Muslim religious leaders will make various policies that will make it difficult for Muslims to carry out various kinds of worship performed by Muslims such as praying, reading the Qur'an, zakat, and fasting.

Contribution: This article is expected to explain the resistance of Muslim youth to candidates leaders of non-Muslim religion in elections. This article is expected to be a lesson for candidates leaders of non-Muslim religions to make various policies that do not hurt Muslims.

Keywords: Hifz Al-Din; Hifz Al-Ummah; Non Muslim Leader, Resistance.

37 Introduction

38

39 The majority of Indonesian residents are occupied by the Muslim community, many scholars
40 think that as a Muslim majority, Indonesia should be led by a Muslim leader (Putra 2019 ;
41 Ardipandanto 2017) . If Indonesia is not led by a Muslim leader, it will harm Muslims both in
42 religious matters and social life. Moreover, this is exacerbated if non-Muslims are prioritized
43 over Muslims (Suryadinata 2015)

44

45 The rejection of Muslims in Indonesia against non-Muslim leaders has very strong reasons.
46 Muslims are disappointed with non-Muslim regional leaders who hurt the trust they have
47 given them (Futano, 2020 ; Hendrastuti 2019 ; Syam 2019) . Several non-Muslim religious
48 leaders have been proven to issue policies that are contrary to Islamic law, and there are even
49 leaders who comment on one of the verses in the Qur'an about choosing a leader (Minan 2019
50 ; Sholikin 2018 ; Djuyandi 2017) .

51

52 The Government of DKI Jakarta has issued several policies that are contrary to the customs of
53 Muslims, such as "forbidding the slaughter of sacrificial animals at schools based on the
54 Governor's Instruction Number 168 of 2015 concerning Pengendalian, Penampungan, dan
55 Pematangan Hewan" (controlling and slaughtering animals). In December 2013, the
56 Government of DKI Jakarta issued a regulation on "Penghapusan aturan pengenaan seragam
57 Muslim di sekolah dasar dan menengah setiap Jumat" (abolishing the rules on the imposition of
58 Muslim uniforms in elementary and primary schools every Friday) based on the circular letter
59 number 48/SE/2014 issued by the Head of the DKI Jakarta Education Office, Lasro Marbun,
60 on July 14, 2014.

61
62 Next, ⁸ Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (known as ⁸ Ahok) who is a Christian was sentenced to
63 blasphemy against Islam in 2016 when he was a ⁸ governor of DKI Jakarta because of his speech.
64 ¹⁵ In his speech, he said "So don't believe in what people say, maybe in your heart you don't want
65 to choose me as a leader, right? Don't you want to be lied (to be fooled) by Al-Maidah: 51,
66 and so on. That's your right ladies and gentlemen, so if you think that you can't vote because
67 you are afraid that you will go to hell because you've been fooled like that, that's okay." This
68 speech was considered by the Ulema and the Muslim community as blasphemy against Islam
69 so that it had an impact on Ahok and even the slogan "Asal bukan Ahok" (As long as it is not
70 Ahok) appeared to characterize Ahok's defeat during the DKI Jakarta Provincial Election and
71 Ahok was imprisoned for blasphemy against Islam.

72
73 Various policies issued by the Governor of DKI Jakarta who are non-Muslims and the incident
74 of blasphemy carried out by a leader in Indonesia have led many Islamic scholars to talk about
75 not choosing non-Muslim leaders because it causes more harm (Sham 2019 ; Bahri 2018). The
76 Ulema from FPI and HTI are one of the groups that are very strict about the prohibition of
77 choosing non-Muslim leaders for Muslim communities such as the Mayor of Solo, Lurah
78 Lenteng Agung and DKI Jakarta, and if there are Muslims who support their leadership, they
79 are sentenced to be *unjust, fasiq and hypocritical*. (Mietzner 2018 ; Suryadinata 2015 ;
80 Maksum 2017 ; Gammon 2020 ; Fathoni 2018). Differences in views about choosing non-
81 Muslim leaders have an impact on the fall of the law on non-Muslim leaders, such as in DKI
82 Jakarta where there is a phenomenon of Muslims refusing to pray for the bodies of Ahok
83 supporters (Mahmuddin 2017) .

84

85 The spread of dogma that encouraged people to choose Muslim leaders increasingly and
86 massively carried out by scholars in da'wah in mosques and da'wah carried out in various social
87 media (Majid 2018) . This action was also carried out in social media such as Facebook,
88 WhatsApp, Twitter and Instagram (Kharisma 2017) . People tended to choose Muslim
89 candidates for regional head election, and because of issues related to ethnicity and religion,
90 the vision and mission of the candidates for regional head received less attention (Triana 2020
91 ; Ningsih 2022 ; Rochayati 2010) . The elections for the regional head that take benefits from
92 religious issues tended to divide society, and it can start conflict (A. Syarif 2021 ; Hasim 2003
93 ; Sumaya 2020) .

94

95 Ethnicity and religion contextually have an impact on voting preferences depending ¹² on the
96 region and the socio-cultural characteristics of the community. Cornelis-Christiandy, who is a
97 Christian, was proven to be elected as a Governor of West Kalimantan, which is dominated by
98 the Muslim community (Zakina 2016) .

99

100 North Sumatra ¹⁴ is one of the provinces in Indonesia which has a population of various religions,
101 namely Muslims, Protestant Christians, Catholic Christians, Confucians, Buddhists, Hindus
102 and other religious beliefs. North Sumatra has an area inhabited by a population of 9,522,822
103 Muslims (63.3%), 4,011,903 by Protestant Christians (26.6%), and 1,102,850 by Catholics
104 (7.3%) (Central Agency Statistics 2018). North Sumatra has 18 regencies with a Muslim
105 majority, 11 regencies with a Christian majority, and 4 regencies with a Muslim and Christian
106 population.

107

108 A person will not be a leader in an area, unless he is of the same religion as the majority of
109 religion in that area. This is not discrimination, but it is done so as not to violate SARA (Tribe,
110 Religion, Race, and Intergroup), and for the sake of maintaining stability, security and public
111 peace (*Hifz Al-Umma*). Ulema (Islamic scholars) explained that it is obligatory to inform the
112 public not to choose non-Muslim leaders, and it is recommended to choose leaders of the same
113 religion (Syarif 2008 ; Sari 2016). When the leader is not in accordance with the teachings of
114 Islam, it does not need to be followed and should be ignored, the leader in the Muslim
115 community must be chosen from Muslims.

116

117 The Islamic teachings in the life of one nation, a state, and a society are crucial because a justice

118 and prosperous country will be realized if the leader is justice so that the people will not suffer.
119 Some principles should be prioritized, namely; (a) *al-tawassuth* (moderate, middle) or not
120 extreme (liberalist-left/fundamentalist-right), not the anti-state concept, believing in theocracy
121 (divinity), aristocracy (kingdom), democracy (populist) and so on. Some aspects required are
122 such as *shura* (deliberation), *al-'adl* (justice), *al-musawah* (equality), and *al-hurriyyah*
123 (freedom) by maintaining 5 human principles (*al-ushulul khamsah*), namely guarding the soul
124 (hifz *an-nafs*), religion (hifz *ad-din*), property (hifz *al-mal*), identity of origin/descendants
125 (hifz *an-nasl*), and self-esteem/honor (hifz *al-'irdh*), (b) *at-Tawazzun*; balanced in the
126 application of rules, texts, ratios, and reality, (c) *al-I'tidal* (perpendicular) or not easily
127 provoked, and (d) *at-Tasamuh* (upholding tolerance). Islam prioritizes benefit in life, as well
128 as in politics. The leader is expected to be a figure who can become an example or what is
129 known as *uswah hasanah* who will make Islam a *rahmatan li al-alamin* .
130

131 **Methods**

132

133 **Study Design and Administration**

134

135 This study uses a cross-sectional design to determine the causes of Muslim resistance to non-
136 Muslim leaders in the regional head election. This research was conducted in North Sumatra,
137 Indonesia from January to December 2021. North Sumatra is one of the provinces that
138 conducted regional head elections in 2018, and the province will conduct another regional
139 head election in 2024. North Sumatra is one of the provinces with a population of various
140 religions, namely Muslims, Protestant Christians, Catholic Christians, Confucians, Buddhists,
141 Hindus and other religious beliefs.
142

143 The researchers created announcements for prospective respondents to participate in this study
144 through several social media such as Instagram, Facebook and WhatsApp groups. Then the
145 prospective respondents who were willing to and in accordance with the criteria in this study
146 were contacted via WhatsApp. The researcher distributed the questionnaire link through the
147 Google form which is an online questionnaire containing the questions for this study.
148

148

149 **Participants**

150

151 To be eligible, the participants of this study should be between 17 and 25 years, Muslim,
152 currently living in North Sumatra, Indonesia. In addition, the participants should have
153 participated in regional head elections, whether regent or mayoral elections or governor
154 elections. The participants were also willing to vote in the regional head election, whether it
155 is the election of regent or mayor or governor elections. The study was followed by 1121
156 Muslim youth who were willing to be respondents and to complete all stages of the research.

157

158 **Measure**

159

160 Hifz Al-Din. The question for Hifz Al-Din is that regional heads who are non-Muslims are
161 afraid to make various policies that can damage the teachings of Islam and obedience to Allah
162 such as difficulties in praying, usury will become legal, liquor or alcohol will become legal,
163 there will be more deviant sects, and so on.

164

165 Hifz Al-Umma. The question for Hifz Al-Ummah is that regional heads who are non-Muslims
166 are afraid to make various policies that can damage the people or nationality, such as
167 government policies that do not support Muslims in carrying out various activities such as
168 going to Madrasa (Islamic schools). The cases of Corruption, Collusion and Nepotism will be
169 increasingly rampant. The cases of people who use psychotropic narcotics will be increased,
170 the ukhuwah Islamiyah in Indonesia will be tenuous, and Muslims will feel insecure in
171 carrying out various activities.

172

173 Regarding Muslim youth resistance against the candidates of non-Muslim regional leader, the
174 question relates to the desire of Muslim youth to elect candidates for regional heads such as
175 governors and mayors who are non-Muslims if they nominate in their area in the regional
176 head elections in 2024.

177

178 **Data Analysis**

179

180 This study will also display cross-tabulation data between Hifz Al-Din and Hifz Al-Ummah
181 on resistance youth Muslim to non-Muslim leader candidates in the election. The analysis in
182 this study will follow multiple logistic regression analyses. Researchers will also display Exp

183 (β) to see how big the influence of Hifz Al-Din and Hifz Al-Ummah on resistance youth
184 Muslim to non-Muslim leaders candidates in the election. First, we calculated the mean and
185 SD of the variables. Next, we performed statistical hypothesis testing analyses, in all cases
186 adopting two-tailed $p < 0.05$ as significance threshold with chi-squared and multiple
187 regression analysis with IBM SPSS 20.

188

189 **Results**

190

191 This study analyzes the causes of Muslim youth resistance against the candidates of non-
192 Muslim regional leaders in the general election. Before carrying out the analysis test, the
193 researchers conducted a normality test using the Kolmogorof Smirnov test. The results of the
194 study can be seen in table 1.

195

196

TABLE 1: Results of Kolmogrov-Smirnov Test

Variables	Sig n	Informat ion
Non-Muslim leaders' policies will make it difficult to pray (pray)	0.482	Test distribution is normal
Non-Muslim leaders' policy will legalize usury	0.51	Test distribution is normal
Non-Muslim leaders' policies will be Heretical religion increase	0.529	Test distribution is normal
Non-Muslim leaders' policy would legalize adultery	0.486	Test distribution is normal
Non-Muslim leaders' policies will lead to civil war	0.497	Test distribution is normal
Non-Muslim leaders' policies will legalize narcotics	0.482	Test distribution is normal
Non-Muslim leaders' policies will legalize criminal action.	0.539	Test distribution is normal
Non-Muslim leaders' policies will bring down Islamic ukhuwah	0.539	Test distribution is normal

197

198

199 **7** The results of this study indicate that the results of the normality test using the Kolmogrov-
200 Smirnov Test show that it has a p value > 0.05, which means a normal distribution.

201

202

203

TABLE 2: Results of Muslim Youth Resistance against Candidates of Non-Muslim Governor and Non-Muslim Mayor In Election

Variable	Resistance Non Muslim Governor Candidates (n=1121)			Major Non-Muslim Resistance Candidates (n=1121)		
	B	Signs	Exp (B) *	B	Signs*	Exp (B) *
	*					
Non-Muslim leaders' policies will make it difficult to pray (pray)	0.918	<0.001	2.505	0.720	<0.001	2,053
Non-Muslim leaders' policy will legalize usury	0.278	0.342	1.321	0.114	0.678	1.121
Non-Muslim leaders' policies will be Heretical religion increase	-0.215	0.493	0.807	-	0.169	0.661
Non-Muslim leaders' policy would legalize adultery	0.317	0.21	1,448	0.326	0.239	1.385
Non-Muslim leaders' policies will lead to civil war	0.786	0.001	2.194	0.588	0.011	1,800
Non-Muslim leaders' policies will legalize narcotics	-0.397	0.168	0.672	-	0.988	0.996
Non-Muslim leaders' policies will legalize criminal action.	-0.315	0.215	0.73	-	0.269	0.771
Non-Muslim leaders' policies will bring down Islamic ukhuwah	0.056	0.883	1.058	-	0.972	0.987
Non-Muslim leaders' policies will lower the sense of security towards the ummah	0.100	0.810	1.105	0.103	0.794	1,108

204 *CI 95%

205

206

207 The results of the logistic regression analysis in this study indicate that “Non-Muslim leaders’
208 policies will make it difficult to pray” affect the resistance of Muslim youth to non-Muslim
209 governor candidates ($p < 0.001$; Exp (B) 2.505) and non-Muslim mayors ($p < 0.001$; Exp(B)
210 2.053). “Non-Muslim leaders’ policies will lead to civil war” affect the resistance of Muslim
211 youth against candidates for non-Muslim governor ($p = 0.001$; Exp (B) 2.194) and non-
212 Muslim mayor ($p = 0.011$; Exp (B) 1.800) .

213

214 Muslim youth with the view of “non-Muslim leaders’ policies will make it difficult to pray”
215 can be seen 2,505 times to have resistance to non-Muslim governor candidates. Muslim
216 youths who consider that “non-Muslim leaders’ policies will make it difficult to pray” have
217 2,053 times to have resistance to non-Muslim mayoral candidates.

218

219 Muslim youth who have view of “non-Muslim leaders’ policies will lead to civil war” have
220 2,194 times have resistance to non-Muslim governor candidates. Muslim youth who have
221 the views of “non-Muslim leaders’ policies will lead to civil war” have 1,800 times resistance
222 to non-Muslim mayoral candidates.

223

224 **Discussion**

225

226 The case of blasphemy against Al-Maidah: 51 carried out by Ahok as a Governor of DKI
227 Jakarta became a turning point for strengthening Muslim resistance to non-Muslim leaders
228 (Nurhajati 2020) . The blasphemy committed by Ahok is not only a socio-religious
229 phenomenon, but this action is also very monumental, and historical, especially for Muslims
230 in Indonesia (Abdullah 2017 ; Huda 2019) .

231

232 Ahok is also considered a governor who often humiliates people in public so that he is not
233 in accordance with existing norms (Mietzner 2018 ; Marshall 2018) . The Government of
234 DKI Jakarta has issued several policies that are contrary to the habits of Muslims in carrying
235 out worship in Islam such as "forbidding the slaughter of sacrificial animals in schools based
236 on the Governor's Instruction Number 168 of 2015 concerning Pengendalian, Penampungan,
237 dan Pematangan Hewan" (controlling and slaughtering animals). In December 2013, the
238 Government of DKI Jakarta issued a regulation on "Abolishing the regulation on the
239 imposition of Muslim uniforms in elementary and secondary schools every Friday". Based

240 on circular letter number 48/SE/2014 issued by the Head of the DKI Jakarta Education
241 Office, Lasro Marbun, on July 14, 2014. Various regulations issued by the DKI Jakarta
242 government have attracted the attention of various Muslims in Indonesia.

243

244 The success of Ulema (Islamic scholars) in the Jakarta regional election indicates a political
245 succession in Indonesia, which is likely to be adopted by a number of other political
246 successions in various regions in Indonesia (Mukti 2019) . Religious ideological factors are
247 the driving force for religious communities to take part in regional head elections
248 (Assyaukanie 2019) .

249

250 The DKI Jakarta's leader election affects other regions that carry out regional head elections,
251 including the pattern of looking for regional leaders. The results of this study indicate those
252 Muslim youths who have the view of "non-Muslim leaders' policies will make it difficult to
253 pray" have 2,505 times to have resistance to non-Muslim governor candidates. Muslim
254 youths who consider that "non-Muslim leaders' policies will make it difficult to pray" have
255 2,053 times to have resistance to non-Muslim mayoral candidates.

256

257 Muslims believe that religion is one of the teachings that must be protected, the protection
258 of Islam is to protect the teachings of Islam so that Muslims do not convert into another
259 religion (Nurlaelawati 2016) . The leader's policy to maintain religion is one of the wishes
260 of the community, especially people who have lived since a long time ago in the area.

261

262 The Regent of Cianjur Regency is a devout Muslim and applies the values of Islamic
263 teachings in people's lives (Lukito 2016). Cianjur Regency has very adaptive and
264 accommodating regulations related to sharia regulations such as the use of headscarves for
265 women, this is inseparable from the regional head who accommodates various sharia
266 regulations through various regional policies (Brotherhood 2018) .

267

268 The policies of regional heads will be related to religious issues and the application of sharia
269 law in their area (Fenton 2016 ; Maksum 2017) . People in Indonesia claim that religion is
270 an important element in their lives, including in their political behavior (Azra 2018) .

271 People in Papua tend to want a leader who fits the dominant society, namely Christianity,
272 because they want a leader who supports the mission of making a Bible city (Mu'ti 2019) .

273 **The residents in Bali also want a leader who proposes various rules that are close to Hinduism**
274 **(Hamid 2020) .**

275 A good leader is when leader can unite the people and fight for the teachings of the Islamic
276 religion in various Islamic policies (Lukito 2021). Leaders must be firm in addressing
277 various existing problems related to Islamic belief and religion, so there will be no problem
278 such as the Ahmadiyah problem in Cianjur Regency (Lukito 2016) .

279

280 FPI (Islamic Defenders Front) revealed that Ahok was a non-Muslim leader who disturbed
281 Muslims in Jakarta. The policies issued were anti-Islam and caused chaos among Muslims
282 (Hidayatullah 2021 ; Abdullah 2017) . Ahok was considered to hate Islam and belittle the
283 Ulema and insult Muslims. Muslims were strongly advised not to vote Ahok as the Governor
284 of DKI Jakarta (Hidayatullah 2021 ; Hasyim 2019) .

285

286 If the government is not careful in making policies related to beliefs and religions, it will
287 increase the risk of conflict based on religion, especially in areas that have multiple
288 ethnicities and religions (Ngusmanto 2016 ; Elyta 2021) . Security will make people respect
289 racial, ethnic, religious and political differences (Kurtz 2008 ; Kristianus 2016) . Differences
290 in political choices also create internal conflicts within Islamic organizations and even cause
291 the head of the Islamic organization to resign from his position (Rasyidin 2016) .

292

293 Ijtima Ulama is a form of effort made by a group of people to support a candidate for a
294 leader. Ijtima Ulama is considered to be a representation of Muslims in choosing a pair of
295 prospective leaders in the hope that the prospective leader will not betray Muslims if they
296 are elected (Assyaukanie 2019). Leader policies can lead to conflict and social integration.
297 Unfair debate and competition will result in contravention and bad prejudice against the
298 background of social jealousy and will increase the risk of social conflict (Ningsih 2022) .

299 The religious elite shows a firm attitude towards corruption, invites people to fight injustice,
300 urges the government to continue to roll out the democratic process and openness, so it can
301 be said that they are carrying out high politics. Political morality lies in the *amar ma'ruf nahi*
302 *mungkar* movement, meaning that he has carried out noble politics (Pababbari 2009) .

303

304 Religion is used by various parties to be a means of winning elections, one team of pairs of
305 candidates for regional heads creates religious conflicts between communities. For example,
306 if a certain religion is the head of the region it will cause chaos or war. Religion actually
307 always teaches noble things and is a moral guide even in running every existing government

308 (Triana 2020 ; Ikhwan 2018) .

309

310 For the Muslim community of North Sumatra, it cannot be separated from strong and basic
311 Islamic values such as the concepts of Faith, Islam and Ihsan, justice, da'wah, and also
312 *rahmatan lil alamin*. The factor of Islamic values as *rahmatan lil alamin* is what shapes
313 perspectives, attitudes and behavior including factors that shape people's identity politics
314 (Tanthowi 2019). Whether as a leader, or being led, individually or in a community, the role
315 and function of religion as an instrument of strengthening ethnicity and nationality in a
316 democratic life will be realized again. The role and function of religion at this level also
317 proves the grounding of the meaning and mission of Islam as *rahmatan lil alamin* (Muhamad
318 2017) .

319

320 Muslims in North Sumatra, besides being presented with a narrative of choosing a Muslim
321 leader to protect the religion of Islam, also received a narrative of choosing a Muslim leader
322 to keep the Ulema from being persecuted. Many people in North Sumatra get the issue that
323 if a non-Muslim leader is elected during the election of the Governor and Deputy Governor
324 of North Sumatra Province, the ulama who are loved by Muslims will be persecuted by the
325 tyrannical government. The election of the Governor of North Sumatra is one of the ways of
326 today's jihad that must be followed by Muslim communities in North Sumatra to win the pair
327 of Muslim leaders. Islamic narratives and symbols continue to be displayed in front of the
328 public by religious leaders and governor candidates when visiting various places during the
329 campaign with the promise to prioritize Muslims in various policies if elected later will make
330 Islam victorious, Islam will exist and Muslims will not experience chaos or commotion.

331

332 Muslims in North Sumatra should view *maqashid sharia* in a dharuriyat manner, it will have
333 implications for the perspective of the Muslim community (further the general public at
334 large) to be able to see the legal reality not only in law as an object but also law as a subject
335 and law as a living value in society. The context in the state is how the practice of Islamic
336 law in Muslim communities will strengthen their Islamic spirit without affecting their human
337 attitude towards people of different religions. When political choices and plurality are not
338 addressed properly and wisely, it will lead to conflicts between religions and within one
339 religion which will then increase the risk of social disintegration (Zainuddin 2015) .
340 Religious leaders are not allowed to impose beliefs and ideologies on others that are contrary

341 to their own religion and beliefs.

342

343 The study of futurologists (the ability to see or to manage life in the future) therefore, from
344 a positive side, concerns about choosing a leader other than Islam because it is contrary to
345 the welfare principle can be seen positively if it does not give subjective discrimination to
346 non-Muslim candidates, causing stratification and discrimination and unequal treatment of
347 people of different religions. Second, it can be viewed negatively if the fear of choosing a
348 non-Muslim leader actually raises subjectivism (close your eyes to see the truth and reality),
349 then to see *Hifdz ummah* which is more relevant to the context of state and state development,
350 to maintain the interests of the people (*Hifdz ummah*) the community does not make religion
351 the only truth value to choose a leader. The way of religion and its religious attitude can be
352 a symbol and a record to assess whether the prospective leader is capable of being
353 trustworthy in his responsibilities and carrying out the vision and mission of development.
354 Then it can be one way, but if choosing fear of choosing non-Muslims is a way to eliminate
355 objectivity in seeing the vision and mission of prospective leaders, then this is something
356 that violates the basic objectives of Islamic law.

357

358 Politics (siyasa) in an Islamic perspective implies the desire or way of Muslims to make
359 Islamic teachings a curriculum of life. This is reflected in all activities of life. This does not
360 mean that the state must be based on the Qur'an, but the values of the Qur'an are reflected
361 in life because the values of the Qur'an are universal. Islamic politics (siyasa islamiyah)
362 aims to elevate the dignity, status and dignity of human beings towards a more qualified and
363 civilized direction according to their functions and duties as the caliph of Allah on earth, to
364 spread mercy and peace and safety for the universe. Islamic politics is achieved if the
365 perpetrators are moral, moral, civilized, and responsible to Allah and the universe (Rosyid
366 2015 ; Alam 2020) . Whoever the leader is, the Muslim community in Indonesia must remain
367 critical but ethical. All of this is done in the context of enjoining *ma'ruf nahi munkar*, ruling
368 goodness, and preventing evil, or damage (Futanu 2020) .

369

370 **Conclusion**

371

372 There are still many Muslim youths who are resistant to non-Muslim regional leaders,

373 including governors and mayors in North Sumatra, Indonesia, which has a multi-religious and
374 multi-ethnic population. Muslim youths have high resistance to non-Muslim governor
375 candidates and non-Muslim mayoral candidates due to the fear of non-Muslim leaders who
376 can forbid them to pray. Muslim youths have high resistance to non-Muslim governor
377 candidates and non-Muslim mayoral candidates due to the fear of non-Muslim leaders who
378 can make policies that lead to civil war.

379

380 Acknowledgments**381 Competing interests**

382 ¹ [information redacted to maintain the integrity of the review process]

383 Authors' contributions

384 [information redacted to maintain the integrity of the review ⁴ process]

385 Ethical considerations

386 This article followed all ethical standards for research without direct contact with human or
387 animal subjects.

388 Funding information

389 ¹ [information redacted to maintain the integrity of the review process]

390 Data availability

391 [information redacted to maintain the integrity of the review process]

392 Disclaimer

393 [information redacted to maintain the integrity of the review process]

394

395

396 **References**

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